

Deliberative Participatory Consultation: The First Deliberative Poll in Porto Alegre¹

James S. Fishkin, Stanford University

Erik Camarano, formerly Government of Rio Grande du Sol

Robert C. Luskin, University of Texas, Austin

Alice Siu, Stanford University

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This is a preliminary report on a statewide Deliberative Poll (DP) held in Porto Alegre, June 5-7, 2009. Porto Alegre is world famous as the home of “participatory budgeting”, the “Orçamento Participativo (OP)”, so the contrast in methods in the two approaches provides an opportunity to highlight some basic questions about ways to consult the public.

Participatory Budgeting has been widely recognized as a path breaking method of public consultation fostering the values of mass participation and deliberation in budget decisions in the city.

To encapsulate a vast discussion, the three criteria that are usually put forward for the merit of the OP are:

- a) Mass participation
- b) Deliberation
- c) Policy effects

By mass participation we mean the involvement of a significant percentage of the eligible population in processes of decision. By deliberation we mean roughly the weighing of reasons for and against competing policy alternatives in a context where the participants have effective access to reasonably good and balanced information (for more on the many complexities in defining these terms see Fishkin 2010, chapter 2). By policy effects we mean simply that the process of public consultation has discernible effects on policies coherently connected to the wishes expressed in the process.

It is clearly the case that the OP realizes all three of these criteria to a significant extent. Yet there are also some clear limits. First, the participation while large is small when viewed as a percentage of the population. Starting from 900 in 1990, it climbed to 6,000 by 1992 and it has reached a peak of about 30,000 since 2000 (Bruce 2004, p. 35). Even counting the most generous estimates, 30,000 in a population of 1.35 million is a small turnout (in the range of 2 per cent). A second issue, at least as important, is the representativeness of the participation. A survey of participation in 2000 showed that 60% of participants in the OP had low education (8 years or less) while only 15.8% of the city population had that level of education. Similarly 30% of the participants were low income (household earnings below only twice the minimum wage) while only 11.4% of city residents were at that income level. The participants also had far more minority participation (28%) as opposed to 15.4% citywide (Baiocchi 2005, table 2).

From the standpoint of social justice one might argue that the over-representation of the poor, the less educated and the racial minorities is a good thing. But it is also arguable that a representation of everyone is what democracy, at least in the form of political equality would require. And the over-representation of certain groups has clearly affected the participation of the middle class. A World Bank survey found that 84% of the public agreed (54% “totally agreed” and 30% “partially agreed” with the statement ““The OP privileges the poor of the neighborhoods and villages of the city.” (World Bank, p.29).

Here are some comments which the World Bank study offered as typical in interviews and focus groups:

“it’s not even worth it for people to go. What is going to happen is that there is going to be half a dozen middle class people wanting something such as safety, health or something like that and about 800 thousand people wanting basic sanitation, paving of streets”... (p. 29)

“if I am always going to compete with unhappy faces without sewers, I am not going to win anything”.(p30)

Of course providing sewers to poor neighborhoods is a great accomplishment. But the inequality of participation undermines any claim to representativeness in the deliberations. The format also limits the deliberations. The basic work of the OP is done in the Assemblies, open to the public. Sixteen of the assemblies are defined by region and six by subject matter. “The meetings are publicized well in advance on TV and radio, with posters, leaflets and loudspeaker cars driving round the neighborhoods. The numbers attending each assembly can vary from 400 or 500 to over 1,500.” At the assemblies, a representative of the finance department explains the procedures and uses a projector to give details of how much money may be available: “There is then time for 15 speakers from the floor, taken on a first come, first-served basis, each with three minutes to argue in favour of a particular set of priorities.” Then citizens fill out ballots, listing their top four choices out of a list of fourteen budget headings. (Bruce, p. 70).

This design for the Assembly only allows, at most fifteen persons out of the hundreds present, to participate in any kind of dialogue or meaningful deliberation. The rest are an audience who hear and then vote. There are also small preparatory meetings in which there is likely more intense deliberation but these are likely to be even more unrepresentative as the preparations will be done by activists.

In addition, there is likely a trade-off between mobilization and deliberation. People are recruited to participate in order to promote specific benefits for their neighborhoods. They come and vote for a prepared program and then may well lose interest after the issue is decided. As one local activist explained the process:

“People go along to get their sewers or their crèche, and then disappear from the participatory budget. This leads to demobilization in their own communities. And to get those people involved again—because mobilization is the real secret of the PB [Participatory Budget or OP]—is quite difficult.” (Bruce, 2004, p. 13, italics added).

Nevertheless, some of the effects of shared discussion which have been found in other deliberative contexts clearly arise in the OP. For example, Abers cites the hypothesis of J.S. Mill that when people

discuss public issues together they will come to value more shared or collective interests (Abers, p. 178). She finds evidence of what she calls “enlarged thinking” in the OP discussions.

“participants began to show solidarity for the needs of the poorest neighborhoods, and they began to see their interests as related to the region as a whole and not just to their own neighborhoods. Although most participants still sought to get their own neighborhood demands met, regionwide unity, solidarity and fairness increasingly became catchwords at neighborhood assemblies and in the budget forum.” (Abers, p. 186.)

These effects on public spiritedness appear similar to those arising in Deliberative Polls (see Farrar, et al 2010 and Fishkin et al 2010.) For an overview see Fishkin 2009).

There is also no question that the OP meetings have policy effects as a portion of the budget of the city is delegated to their decision. There are, however, issues of accountability and follow through. Surveys show an increase in skepticism about policy effects in recent years, but much of this may be attributed to the fact that the investment plans from the OP were not fulfilled following the financial crisis of 2002. (World Bank p. 75). We will treat non-fulfillment as a temporary aberration and assume that the process usually has substantial policy effects.

From a normative standpoint, we would posit a revised set of criteria:

- a) Political Equality
- b) Deliberation
- c) Policy Effects.

By political equality we mean roughly the equal consideration of the views of everyone in the eligible population (for more discussion see Fishkin, 2009, chapter 2). This equal consideration could come through an equal counting of everyone, when everyone or virtually everyone participates. Or it could come through an equal chance of being selected, via random sampling, combined with an equal counting of the views of those selected. Departures from political equality in this sense will lead to distortions of unrepresentativeness. Hence the over-representation of the poor and less educated and the under-representation of middle class respondents in the OP is a violation of political equality in this sense. It is, of course, an empirical question whether a particular DP does any better.

The Deliberative Poll in Porto Alegre

The first Deliberative Poll (DP) in Latin America was held June 5-7, 2009 in Porto Alegre. A scientific microcosm of the entire state of Rio Grande do Sul gathered for a weekend of small group

discussions and dialogue with competing policy experts. At the end, they filled out the same confidential questionnaire as when first contacted.

The participants deliberated about the difficult issue of career reform in the civil service. They moved away from “years in service” as a criterion for promotion and compensation. After considering arguments for and against different proposals, a number had strong majority support at the end of the process.

Sampling and Recruitment

The survey firm Methodus interviewed a random (area probability) sample of 1,651 adult (eighteen years-old or older) residents of Rio Grande do Sul, with quotas at the household level for gender, age, education, and income. Of these, 236 attended the deliberative weekend, and 226 of them completed the post event questionnaire. We refer to these 226 as “participants;” and the remaining 1,425—who were interviewed but did not attend (or in 10 cases attended but did not complete the post-event questionnaire)—as “nonparticipants.”

Representativeness

The participants were a good, representative sample of the state’s adult (eighteen-years-old or older) population. One way of judging that is to compare the participants with the nonparticipants. On most demographic characteristics and virtually all pre-deliberation policy attitudes, the differences are slight.

[Insert Table I about here.]

For example, the participants averaged less than a year older than the nonparticipants (40.6 years versus 39.7 years), and included slightly less than 1% less men (46.5% versus 47.2%). These are minor and statistically “insignificant” differences. The percentages in each category of educational attainment—“less than primary school,” “finished primary school,” “incomplete high school,” “finished high school,” “incomplete college,” and “finished college,”—are similar, differing primarily between in the “less than primary school” and “finished college” categories, that is participants are slightly more educated. For household income, in every category—“less than R\$ 930,” “R\$ 931 - R\$ 2235,” “R\$ 2236 - R\$ 4650,” “R\$ 4651 - R\$ 6300,” and “more than R\$ 6301,”—the difference between participants and nonparticipants is small. The average difference is about 3 percent, and the largest is under 4%. The differences with respect to number of children and employment status are similar, with 2% more of the non-participants having no children and roughly 2% less of them working full time).

There was also good representation geographically. Table I also shows a breakdown comparing participants and non-participants in 29 cities around the state.

The one respect in which the sample is noticeably off makes it conservative, in the sense of ensuring that public sector employee concerns were fully taken into account. Public sector employees are considerably *overrepresented* in the interview sample as a whole. The percentage of active public sector employees at all levels—federal, state, and municipal—is 18.4% among the participants and 13.5% among the nonparticipants but only approximately 4.5% among state’s adult population. So public sector employees are overrepresented among both the participants and the nonparticipants. The percentage of active *state* public sector employees, also higher among both participants and nonparticipants than in the state population (where it is just over 2%), is marginally higher among the participants than the nonparticipants (9.8% versus 4.3%). Here public sector employees are more overrepresented among the participants than the nonparticipants.

The comparison of participants and non-participants based on their initial interviews also permits us to judge the attitudinal as well as the demographic representativeness of the participants.

[Insert Table III about here]

Here the results make an impressive case for representativeness. Out of 29 substantive policy questions, only three showed a statistically significant difference between participants and non-participants. And those differences, while significant, tended to be small in magnitude. In addition, they were mostly on fairly trivial issues. On the key issues of the deliberation, whether time in service should determine pay and promotion or whether other factors such as productivity and various merit measures should count as well, there were no significant differences. On three specific items—relevance of professional training, self-evaluations and the importance of being pro-active, there were substantively small differences significant at a .05 level. Overall, it is clear that the microcosm was a microcosm of the state’s attitudes as well as its demographics—all gathered in one room prepared to deliberate.

Policy Attitudes Before and After Deliberation

Table IV shows policy attitudes before and after deliberation. The tables showing both the means and the percentages were released to the press when the government announced the results.

[Insert Table IV about here]

In addition to the 29 policy questions asked on first contact (which we used to evaluate attitudinal representativeness), there were ten more questions included in the arrival questionnaire (which also included the previously asked items). The table shows the change, if any, from the earliest measurement

available. The additional questions mostly focused on empirical premises about what policies would, or would not be, effective. Overall, there is a great deal of change from deliberation. Of the 39 questions, 23 show statistically significant change, 22 at the .01 level.

Some of these changes are consequential for policy. For example, the percentage thinking “years in service” was important in awarding pay increases began at 66% before deliberation but dropped to 49% by the end of the weekend (a drop from .711 to .60 on a 0 to 1 scale). This is a significant change from majority to minority support. When asked to weigh “years in service” versus “productivity” as the basis for promotion, the percentage believing productivity should be the basis increased from an already high level of 69% before deliberation to 71% afterwards. Both before and after deliberations, productivity was thought to be important for promotion by an overwhelming majority (92% at the end of the deliberations).

The participants expressed overwhelming majority support both before and after for a number of ways to evaluate civil servants. The factors that started high and remained high included: “team performance” (78% support at the end of deliberations), “individual performance” (80%), “education level” (83%), “job related awards” (72%), “education level” (82.5%), “professional training” (90%), “external evaluation” (77%), “attendance” (82%), “being proactive” (93%), “professional training and development” (95%), “community involvement” (74%), “education level” (82%), “external evaluation” (71%), “exam qualifications” (83%) and “punctuality” (94%). These opinions, all with more than 70% majorities after deliberation, reflect what the people are willing to support after they have considered the arguments on either side.

Some criteria for promotion went down significantly, although they maintained bare majority support. Support for “evaluations by co workers” went down from 72% to 52% and support for “evaluations by subordinates” went down from 70% to 51%. Similarly, support for “self-evaluations” as a criterion went down from 81% to 61%. After deliberation, the respondents appeared to prefer reliance on objective criteria for promotion whenever possible.

Participants were also asked a series of questions about what measures would be effective in increasing the productivity of civil servants. “Requiring more years in service for promotion” dropped from 47% before deliberation to only 35% after. Support for the effectiveness of a number of measures stayed high both before and after: “bonuses based on performance” (78% after deliberation), “bonuses based on acquiring relevant job skills” (78%), “promotions based on performance” (86%), “penalties for poor performance” (56%), and “exams to measure qualifications for promotion” (83%). Support for some specific measures went down, while still maintaining majority support. “Increasing the number of job titles” went from 86% before deliberation to 63% after. “Recognition for good performance” went from 96% before deliberation to 84% after while “regular evaluations by supervisors” went from 79% before deliberation to 68% after.

About the overall number of civil servants, participants were asked to choose between “hiring as many as possible regardless of productivity” and hiring “as few as possible with high productivity.” After deliberation support for the latter position was 74% (increasing from 70%). Both before and after, there was majority support for the proposition that civil servants should be “penalized for poor performance regardless of how long they have served” (55% and 60%). Support for the contrasting notion that “long-serving civil servants should not be penalized for poor performance” was only 19% after deliberation.

While there was considerable change in these results, it is worth taking account not only of the changes but also the final considered judgments whatever they may be, regardless of whether they changed or not. Before deliberation a respondent is most likely uninformed on the issues and may offer simply a top of the head impression of sound bites and headlines. In the DP process respondents will have weighed competing arguments and become more informed about all the conflicting considerations. If they come out the same way after really considering the arguments on the other side, then that opinion should be thought of as a considered judgment. It has survived the battle of competing arguments on the basis of good information.

Knowledge

The participants learned a lot from the process about the policy issues. They were asked knowledge questions before and after. They were asked about the revenues of the state government, the fiscal responsibility act in 2001, the composition of the work force, the retirement policies. Some of the knowledge gains were large (for example the percentage knowing the percentage of the work force in Education, Health and Safety increased from 14% to 50%). Overall, the knowledge index of five questions increased from 19% getting the questions correct before deliberation to 32% getting them correct afterwards.

[Insert Table V about here]

Attitudes toward the State Government

Before deliberation 44% of the participants thought that the “the State Government of Rio Grande do Sul can be trusted to do the right thing” only “less than half the time.” This level of mistrust fell to 32% after deliberation. Before deliberation 64% thought that “the state Government of Rio Grande do Sul cares what people like me think” only “less than half of the time.” After deliberation this level of mistrust fell 34%.

Evaluations of the Event

The participants greatly enjoyed and appreciated the experience of participating in the deliberative weekend. Asked to rate the event as a whole on a 0-10 scale from a “waste of time” (0) to “extremely valuable” (10), 84.1% considered it valuable (rating it above 5), and 53.6% gave it a perfect 10. Only 3.5% considered it less than valuable (rating it below 5).

The small group discussions, talking with other participants outside the small group discussions, and the plenary sessions with the panels of experts received similarly high marks. The small group discussions were considered valuable by 94.7% and given a perfect 10 by 67.1%, talking with other participants outside the small group discussions was considered valuable by 93.3% and given a perfect 10 by 61.3%, and the plenary sessions were considered valuable by 88.0% and given a perfect 10 by 56.0%.

The participants saw the process as balanced and thorough. 93.8% agreed that their small group moderator “provided the opportunity for everyone to participate in the discussion.” 80.4% *disagreed* that their small group moderator “sometimes tried to influence the group with his or her own views.” 92.0% agreed that “the important aspects of the issues were covered in the group discussions.” The briefing material received somewhat lower but still fairly high marks. 57.0% described it as “mostly balanced,” while 35.6% thought that it “clearly favored some positions over others.”

Finally, the participants greatly appreciated the opportunity of getting to know their fellow participants, coming from all across the state and from all walks of life. 90.6% agreed that “I learned a lot about people very different from me - about what they and their lives are like.”

Conclusion

Returning to our three criteria for evaluating public consultation, it is obviously the case that the DP better realized political equality in its representativeness of the population. Our data permit both an attitudinal and demographic comparison of participants and non-participants in the original random sample and the case for representativeness in the DP as contrasted with the OP is strong. While the scale of participation was much smaller in the DP than the OP, both are tiny percentages of the whole population and so the distortions in the OP as compared to the DP arguably support the latter design. As for deliberation, the substantial information gains and attitude changes as well as the self-reported evaluations suggest substantial deliberation. Additionally we plan small group analyses to add to our

qualitative impression of a high quality deliberation on difficult issues. On the last criterion, policy effects, the OP has a far more impressive track record. Still, the DP received substantial media coverage (see Brazil section of <http://cdd.stanford.edu>) and it was the basis for the Governor's proposed legislative reform of the career service system for civil servants. In keeping with the DP results, she proposed a general introduction of a 14th pay grade to be awarded on the basis of productivity. However, this broad reform was opposed by unions and a more modest proposal was substituted, leading to successful passage. The final bill did include some reforms connected to the DP. For example, the career path for "planning technicians" was amended to include additional flexible pay to reward merit, a result in keeping with the DP recommendations.

In principle, there is no reason why the DP could not have further policy effects. It has in various parts of the world, including energy choices in Texas and infrastructure choices in China (see Fishkin, 2009, chapter 5). To have had any policy effects in a first trial must be counted a success.

Table I: Demographic Representativeness

** $p < .01$ * $p < .05$

	Participants (N)	Non participants (N)
Age (in years)	40.6 (226)	39.7 (1425)
Sex - Male	46.5% (226)	47.2% (1425)
Marital Status*		
Single (never married)	29.2%	29.8%
Married	35.4%	41.1%
Lives as married	13.3%	13.8%
Separate	11.5%	5.5%
Divorced	4.9%	4.2%
Widower	5.8%	5.7%

Total	100% (226)	100% (1425)
Number of children		
0	25.2%	27.1%
1	20.8%	23.9%
2	23.9%	22.5%
3	13.3%	13.5%
4	6.6%	6.7%
5	4.0%	3.2%
More than 5	6.2%	3.0%
Total	100% (226)	100% (1425)
Occupation		
Full Time	54.4%	52.0%
Part Time	8.8%	8.5%
Retired	13.3%	10.9%
Unemployed/Looking for work	7.5%	6.2%
Unemployed/Not looking for work	2.7%	2.0%
Studying full time	2.2%	2.5%
Caretaker	7.1%	13.9%
Permanently sick or disabled	0.9%	0.9%
Caring for an elderly full time	1.3%	0.7%
Other	1.8%	2.7%
Total	100% (226)	100% (1425)

Sector of Work*		
Municipal Public Sector	6.3%	6.6%
State Public Sector	9.8%	4.3%
Federal Public Sector	2.3%	2.6%
Private Sector	57.5%	58.6%
Non-profit	1.1%	0.3%
Autonomous	23.0%	27.6%
Total	100% (174)	100% (1038)
Schooling**		
Some basic education	20.4%	28.4%
Complete basic education	21.2%	23.5%
Some high school	9.7%	5.8%
High School diploma	31.9%	30.6%
Some college	5.8%	5.8%
College degree	11.1%	5.9%
Total	100% (226)	100% (1425)
Household income		
Below R\$ 930	31.0%	27.5%
R\$ 931 - R\$ 2235	31.0%	33.4%
R\$ 2236 - R\$ 4650	23.5%	19.8%
R\$ 4651 - R\$ 6300	7.5%	9.5%
Above R\$ 6301	7.1%	9.8%

	100% (226)	100% (1425)
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Table II: Geographical Representation by City

City		
ARROIO DO MEIO	0.4%	1.2%
BAGÉ	3.1%	2.3%
BENTO GONÇALVES	0.4%	1.5%
BUTI	0.0%	1.4%
CAMAQUA	0.4%	1.4%
CANOAS	4.0%	5.0%
CAXIAS DO SUL	6.2%	5.9%
ENCRUZILHADA DO SUL	0.9%	1.3%
ERECHIM	2.2%	3.9%
GRAMADO	0.9%	1.2%
GUAÍBA	0.4%	1.8%
IJUI	2.2%	2.5%
JULIO DE CASTILHOS	0.9%	1.5%
LAJEADO	1.3%	1.9%
N.HAMBURGO	5.3%	3.7%
OSORIO	1.8%	1.1%
PASSO FUNDO	7.1%	7.0%
PELOTAS	4.9%	4.4%
PORTO ALEGRE	27.9%	28.7%
RIO GRANDE	4.4%	2.2%

ROSARIO DO SUL	1.3%	1.2%
SANTA CRUZ	4.4%	3.5%
SANTA MARIA	2.7%	3.3%
SANTO ANGELO	2.2%	2.5%
SOLEDADE	2.2%	1.1%
TORRES	1.3%	1.6%
URUGUAIANA	4.0%	2.2%
VACARIA	0.9%	1.4%
VIAMÃO	6.2%	3.7%
Total	100% (226)	100% (1425)

Table III: Attitudinal Representativeness

* = p <.05; ** = p<.01	Participantes - % (N=226)	Não-Participantes - % (N=1425)
Q1. Pay increases based on years in service vs. performance.	.716	.728
1 - Service	11.5	12.5
2	2.2	2.3
3	3.5	4.0
4	15.9	11.6
5	8.8	7.4
6	10.6	11.0
7 - Performance	47.3	51.2
DK	0.0	0.6
Q2. Promoted increases based on years in service vs. productivity.	.740	.767

1 - Service	11.5	10.3
2	1.8	1.6
3	1.3	3.8
4	16.8	10.5
5	7.1	6.5
6	8.0	10.6
7 - Productivity	53.5	56.7
DK	0.0	0.5
On a scale 0-10, where 0 is not extremely unimportant, 10 is extremely important and 5 is exactly in the middle. How important do you think each of the following items should be in time to give pay rises for civil servants:		
Q3. Unimportant vs. Important: Years in service	.705	.692
0-4 Unimportant	12.0	13.8
5	22.2	19.0
6-10 - Important	65.6	67.1
DK	0.4	0.6
Q4. Unimportant vs. Important: Team performance	.772	.771
0-4 Unimportant	8.0	5.1
5	10.7	12.7
6-10 - Important	81.2	82.1
DK	0.9	0.8
Q5. Unimportant vs. Important: Individual Performance	.820	.817
0-4 Unimportant	5.7	4.4
5	6.6	7.8
6-10 - Important	87.6	87.8
DK	0.0	0.6
Q6. Unimportant vs. Important: Letters of Recommendation	.584	.600
0-4 Unimportant	31.3	26.7
5	16.1	17.3
6-10 - Important	52.6	55.9
DK	0.9	2.0

Q7. Unimportant vs. Important: Supervisor evaluations	.756	.761
0-4 Unimportant	8.5	6.4
5	13.5	12.5
6-10 - Important	78.0	81.1
DK	1.3	0.6
Q8. Unimportant vs. Important: Job-related awards	.763	.753
0-4 Unimportant	9.4	8.9
5	12.5	10.7
6-10 - Important	78.1	80.2
DK	0.9	1.3
Q9. Unimportant vs. Important: Education Level	.830	.824
0-4 Unimportant	5.2	4.8
5	6.2	9.0
6-10 - Important	88.5	86.2
DK	0.4	0.3
Q10. Unimportant vs. Important: Professional training*	.882	.850
0-4 Unimportant	1.7	1.9
5	3.1	5.2
6-10 - Important	95.0	93.0
DK	1.3	0.6
Q11. Unimportant vs. Important: External evaluation	.769	.776
0-4 Unimportant	7.1	6.8
5	12.0	11.3
6-10 - Important	80.8	82.0
DK	0.4	1.5
In the same range 0-10, what is the importance you give to each of the items when deciding to promote or not public officials to higher positions:		
Q12. Unimportant vs. Important: Productivity	.884	.864
0-4 Unimportant	1.7	2.3
5	3.6	5.0
6-10 - Important	94.7	92.7

DK	0.4	0.4
Q13. Unimportant vs. Important: Attendance	.896	.875
0-4 Unimportant	1.7	2.5
5	2.2	3.9
6-10 - Important	96.0	93.5
DK	0.9	0.5
Q14. Unimportant vs. Important: Punctuality	.930	.914
0-4 Unimportant	0.4	1.4
5	2.7	2.2
6-10 - Important	96.9	96.4
DK	0.4	0.4
Q15. Unimportant vs. Important: Being proactive *	.925	.904
0-4 Unimportant	0.0	0.7
5	2.2	2.5
6-10 - Important	97.8	96.7
DK	0.9	0.4
Q16. Unimportant vs. Important: Professional training and development	.897	.888
0-4 Unimportant	0.4	0.8
5	3.1	3.5
6-10 - Important	96.5	95.8
DK	0.4	0.6
Q17. Unimportant vs. Important: Community Involvement	.833	.831
0-4 Unimportant	2.1	3.0
5	8.9	6.8
6-10 - Important	88.9	90.2
DK	0.4	0.6
Q18. Unimportant vs. Important: Education Level	.837	.849
0-4 Unimportant	3.1	3.3
5	10.7	5.6

6-10 - Important	86.2	91.2
DK	0.4	0.9
Q19. Unimportant vs. Important: External evaluation	.750	.746
0-4 Unimportant	8.9	7.3
5	8.9	13.0
6-10 - Important	82.2	79.8
DK	0.9	1.6
Q20. Unimportant vs. Important: Supervisor evaluations	.805	.806
0-4 Unimportant	3.9	3.6
5	7.6	8.0
6-10 - Important	88.5	88.5
DK	0.4	0.6
Q21. Unimportant vs. Important: Evaluations by coworkers	.706	.702
0-4 Unimportant	11.6	12.4
5	16.1	16.2
6-10 - Important	72.3	71.4
DK	0.9	0.4
Q22. Unimportant vs. Important: Evaluations by subordinates	.708	.700
0-4 Unimportant	11.5	12.9
5	18.2	14.0
6-10 - Important	70.1	73.0
DK	0.4	0.8
Q23. Unimportant vs. Important: Self-Evaluations *	.780	.740
0-4 Unimportant	6.6	11.3
5	12.5	11.6
6-10 - Important	80.7	77.1
DK	0.9	0.6
Q24. Unimportant vs. Important: Exam qualifications	.864	.862

0-4 Unimportant	2.1	1.8
5	6.7	4.7
6-10 - Important	91.1	93.5
DK	0.4	0.5
Q25. Move civil servants wherever most needed vs. remain existing locations if they wish	.468	.514
1 - Move wherever needed	24.3	26.5
2	7.1	5.3
3	17.7	11.2
4	15.9	14.7
5	7.5	5.4
6	4.4	6.7
7 - Able to stay at current location	23.0	30.2
DK	0.0	0.6
Q26. Earn close to same wages regardless of kinds of work or qualifications vs. significantly different wages*	.897	.860
1 - Wages all close to the same	0.9	4.7
2	0.9	0.9
3	3.1	2.4
4	5.3	5.7
5	5.8	6.2
6	11.9	12.5
7 - Significantly different	72.1	67.6
DK	0.0	0.4
Q27. Receive pay from union dues vs. pay from the State Gov't	.448	.452
1 - Pay from union dues	38.3	38.9
2	2.3	3.6
3	11.7	9.4
4	10.4	9.9
5	3.2	2.8
6	5.9	4.3
7 - Pay from State Gov't	28.4	31.0
DK	1.8	2.7

Q28. Penalize poor performance, regardless of time in service vs. not penalize poor performance by long-serving civil servants	.389	.409
1 - Penalize poor performance, regardless of time in service	35.6	34.3
2	7.6	6.9
3	12.0	12.6
4	17.3	16.0
5	4.0	5.0
6	7.6	5.6
7 - Not penalize poor performance by long-serving C.S.	16.0	19.6
DK	0.4	1.2
Q29. Hire as many as possible, regardless of productivity vs. few as possible with high productivity	.786	.781
1 - Hire as many as possible, regardless of productivity	4.9	6.8
2	0.4	1.1
3	4.0	4.7
4	20.4	15.1
5	5.8	5.6
6	8.0	9.2
7 - Few as possible with high productivity	56.4	57.4
DK	0.4	0.3

Table IV: Policy Attitudes Before and After Deliberation

	Before	After
Q1. Pay increases based on years in service vs. performance.	0.716	0.741
1 - Service	11.5	7.7
2	2.2	0.5
3	3.5	0.5
4	15.9	22.1
5	8.8	11.7
6	10.6	15.8

7 - Performance	47.3	41.9
DK	0.0	1.8
Q2. Promoted increases based on years in service vs. productivity.	0.740	0.731
1 - Service	11.5	6.7
2	1.8	1.8
3	1.3	2.7
4	16.8	17.9
5	7.1	15.2
6	8.0	17.9
7 - Productivity	53.5	37.9
DK	0.0	0.9
Q3. Unimportant vs. Important: Years in service **	0.711	0.600
0-4 Unimportant	12.0	24.0
5	22.2	27.2
6-10 - Important	65.6	48.8
DK	0.4	4.0
Q4. Unimportant vs. Important: Team performance	0.776	0.759
0-4 Unimportant	8.0	11.1
5	10.7	11.1
6-10 - Important	81.2	77.8
DK	0.9	4.4
Q5. Unimportant vs. Important: Individual Performance	0.821	0.794
0-4 Unimportant	9.0	10.7
5	6.6	8.9
6-10 - Important	87.6	80.4
DK	0.0	5.3
Q6. Unimportant vs. Important: Letters of Recommendation **	0.579	0.426
0-4 Unimportant	31.3	51.9
5	16.1	16.2
6-10 - Important	52.6	31.9
DK	0.9	7.1
Q7. Unimportant vs. Important: Supervisor evaluations **	0.755	0.678
0-4 Unimportant	8.5	16.6
5	13.5	18.5
6-10 - Important	78.0	64.9

	DK	1.3	6.6
Q8. Unimportant vs. Important: Job-related awards		0.757	0.710
0-4 Unimportant		9.4	13.6
5		12.5	15.0
6-10 - Important		78.1	71.5
DK		0.9	5.3
Q9. Unimportant vs. Important: Education Level		0.831	0.813
0-4 Unimportant		5.2	6.6
5		6.2	10.8
6-10 - Important		88.5	82.5
DK		0.4	6.2
Q10. Unimportant vs. Important: Professional training		0.883	0.861
0-4 Unimportant		1.7	4.2
5		3.1	6.0
6-10 - Important		95.0	89.8
DK		1.3	4.4
Q11. Unimportant vs. Important: External evaluation		0.765	0.777
0-4 Unimportant		7.1	9.3
5		12.0	13.5
6-10 - Important		80.8	77.2
DK		0.4	4.9
Q12. Unimportant vs. Important: Productivity		0.885	0.874
0-4 Unimportant		1.7	4.5
5		3.6	3.6
6-10 - Important		94.7	91.9
DK		0.4	2.2
Q13. Unimportant vs. Important: Attendance **		0.896	0.824
0-4 Unimportant		1.7	6.4
5		2.2	11.5
6-10 - Important		96.0	82.1
DK		0.9	3.5
Q14. Unimportant vs. Important: Punctuality **		0.934	0.901
0-4 Unimportant		0.4	2.3
5		2.7	3.7

6-10 - Important	96.9	94.0
DK	0.4	4.4
Q15. Unimportant vs. Important: Being proactive **	0.927	0.880
0-4 Unimportant	0.0	2.7
5	2.2	4.5
6-10 - Important	97.8	92.7
DK	0.9	2.7
Q16. Unimportant vs. Important: Professional training and development	0.900	0.902
0-4 Unimportant	0.4	2.8
5	3.1	1.9
6-10 - Important	96.5	95.4
DK	0.4	4.4
Q17. Unimportant vs. Important: Community Involvement **	0.832	0.734
0-4 Unimportant	2.1	11.6
5	8.9	14.4
6-10 - Important	88.9	74.1
DK	0.4	4.4
Q18. Unimportant vs. Important: Education Level	0.837	0.819
0-4 Unimportant	3.1	6.5
5	10.7	12.0
6-10 - Important	86.2	81.6
DK	0.4	4.0
Q19. Unimportant vs. Important: External evaluation	0.748	0.727
0-4 Unimportant	8.9	15.7
5	8.9	13.4
6-10 - Important	82.2	70.8
DK	0.9	4.4
Q20. Unimportant vs. Important: Supervisor evaluations **	0.806	0.707
0-4 Unimportant	3.9	15.0
5	7.6	15.0
6-10 - Important	88.5	70.0
DK	0.4	2.7
Q21. Unimportant vs. Important: Evaluations by coworkers **	0.700	0.568

0-4 Unimportant	11.6	29.9
5	16.1	17.8
6-10 - Important	72.3	52.3
DK	0.9	5.3
Q22. Unimportant vs. Important: Evaluations by subordinates **	0.705	0.574
0-4 Unimportant	11.5	28.6
5	18.2	20.3
6-10 - Important	70.1	51.2
DK	0.4	4.0
Q23. Unimportant vs. Important: Self-Evaluations **	0.778	0.649
0-4 Unimportant	6.6	19.1
5	12.5	19.5
6-10 - Important	80.7	61.4
DK	0.9	2.7
Q24. Unimportant vs. Important: Exam qualifications **	0.863	0.815
0-4 Unimportant	2.1	7.7
5	6.7	9.1
6-10 - Important	91.1	83.2
DK	0.4	2.7
Q25. Move civil servants wherever most needed vs. remain existing locations if they wish	0.462	0.481
1 - Move wherever needed	24.3	21.0
2	7.1	3.7
3	17.7	12.8
4	15.9	32.9
5	7.5	3.7
6	4.4	10.0
7 - Able to stay at current location	23.0	16.0
DK	0.0	3.1
Q26. Earn close to same wages regardless of kinds of work or qualifications vs. significantly different wages	0.897	0.875
1 - Wages all close to the same	0.9	2.3
2	0.9	1.4
3	3.1	0.9
4	5.3	5
5	5.8	7.3
6	11.9	21.4

7 - Significantly different	72.1	61.8
DK	0.0	2.7
Q27. Receive pay from union dues vs. pay from the State Gov't	0.441	0.400
1 - Pay from union dues	38.3	37.3
2	2.3	6.9
3	11.7	9.2
4	10.4	16.6
5	3.2	4.1
6	5.9	7.4
7 - Pay from State Gov't	28.4	18.4
DK	1.8	4.0
Q28. Penalize poor performance, regardless of time in service vs. not penalize poor performance by long-serving civil servants	0.393	0.343
1 - Penalize poor performance, regardless of time in service	35.6	34.3
2	7.6	12
3	12	13.9
4	17.3	20.8
5	4	3.7
6	7.6	3.7
7 - Not penalize poor performance by long-serving C.S.	16	11.6
DK	0.4	4.4
Q29. Hire as many as possible, regardless of productivity vs. few as possible with high productivity	0.786	0.790
1 - Hire as many as possible, regardless of productivity	4.9	5.4
2	0.4	0.5
3	4	0.5
4	20.4	19.8
5	5.8	7.2
6	8	14.9
7 - Few as possible with high productivity	56.4	51.8
DK	0.4	1.8
30. Bonuses based on performance **	0.822	0.732
Very ineffective	2.2	8.8
Somewhat ineffective	5.3	10.1
Neither ineffective nor effective	9.3	3.2
Somewhat effective	28.4	35.5
Very effective	54.7	42.4

DK	0.4	4.0
31. Bonuses based on acquiring relevant job skills **	0.835	0.765
Very ineffective	2.2	4.7
Somewhat ineffective	2.7	7.0
Neither ineffective nor effective	8.4	10.8
Somewhat effective	33.2	32.4
Very effective	53.5	45.1
DK	0.0	0.0
32. Regular evaluations from supervisors **	0.792	0.695
Very ineffective	1.8	9.2
Somewhat ineffective	3.5	6.9
Neither ineffective nor effective	15.9	15.7
Somewhat effective	34.1	33.2
Very effective	44.7	35.0
DK	0.0	4.0
33. Promotions based on performance **	0.896	0.829
Very ineffective	1.8	6.6
Somewhat ineffective	0.9	3.3
Neither ineffective nor effective	2.2	4.3
Somewhat effective	26.5	23.2
Very effective	68.6	62.6
DK	0.0	6.6
34. Recognition for good performance **	0.916	0.832
Very ineffective	0.9	7.7
Somewhat ineffective	0.9	3.9
Neither ineffective nor effective	2.2	4.3
Somewhat effective	24.8	15.9
Very effective	71.2	68.1
DK	0.0	8.4
35. Penalties for poor performance	0.623	0.631
Very ineffective	10.6	11.7
Somewhat ineffective	14.6	15.0
Neither ineffective nor effective	19	17.0
Somewhat effective	29.2	21.8
Very effective	26.5	34.5
DK	0.0	8.8

36. Increasing the wage differences between job titles **	0.822	0.702
Very ineffective	2.7	9.3
Somewhat ineffective	2.7	7.3
Neither ineffective nor effective	9.8	15.1
Somewhat effective	34.2	29.8
Very effective	50.7	38.5
DK	0.4	9.3
37. Increasing the number of job titles **	0.841	0.671
Very ineffective	1.4	8.0
Somewhat ineffective	1.8	8.9
Neither ineffective nor effective	10.5	20.2
Somewhat effective	33.2	31.5
Very effective	53.2	31.5
DK	2.7	5.8
38. Requiring more years in service for promotion **	0.555	0.467
Very ineffective	15.6	24.5
Somewhat ineffective	15.6	13.0
Neither ineffective nor effective	21.4	27.4
Somewhat effective	27.7	21.6
Very effective	19.6	13.5
DK	0.9	8.0
39. Exams to measure qualifications for promotion	0.814	0.808
Very ineffective	3.1	10.2
Somewhat ineffective	4	2.8
Neither ineffective nor effective	7.1	4.2
Somewhat effective	33.3	18.6
Very effective	52.4	64.2
DK	0.4	4.9

Table V Knowledge Before and After Deliberation

	Before (% correct)	After (%correct)

** In 2007, what percentage of the net current revenue of the State Government do personnel spending, excluding pensions and income tax deductions, account for? (Correct answer: About 70%)	18.8	32.7
The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2001... (Correct answer: Placed a cap on personnel spending for all governments.)	30.6	36.5
** Which of the following statements about the composition of the civil servant workforce is true? (Correct answer: More than 90% are in Education, Health, and Safety.)	14.3	49.8
Which of the following statements is FALSE? (Correct answer: All civil servants who work for a minimum of 25 years are eligible for retirement.)	15.9	16.4
** In the State Government of Rio Grande do Sul, there are roughly... (Correct answer: About equal amount of active than inactive civil servants and pensioners.)	14.6	26.1
**Index	18.8	32.2

** $p < .01$

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