

Deliberation and “Better Citizens”*

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Deliberation is commonly claimed to enhance the quality of democracy. It is claimed to make for “better citizens,” in Mansbridge’s (1999) phrase, as well as better outcomes. But does it, actually? And in what sense(s)? The answers depend, obviously, on the specification of “better.” They also depend, also obviously, on one’s definition of deliberation, one’s theory about its effects, and of course the evidence. All these matters could stand more attention, but evidence is particularly wanted.

By “deliberation” we mean a process of learning, thinking, and talking about policy and electoral choices. Deliberating citizens seek relevant information, reflect on the issues, and exchange views with others. The most valuable kind of deliberation is balanced, taking account of information both convenient and inconvenient to given arguments and alternatives, although much naturally occurring deliberation is of course highly imbalanced. People tend to acquire information disproportionately consistent with what they already have, think mainly along customary lines, and talk mostly with others who think as they do. We do not wish to bar such imbalanced deliberation by definition, but the kind of deliberation from which we expect improving effects is balanced. The root of “deliberation,” recall, is “to weigh.” The deliberation that does the most good involves weighing the merits of competing arguments.

This essay examines the senses in which such deliberation may be thought to make for better citizens, considers the nature of deliberation and its relationships to the attributes constituting better citizenship, and addresses the question of whether the posited effects do in fact seem to obtain. The empirical portion of this enterprise relies on data from Deliberative polls, in which random samples are interviewed, assembled at a common site, given the opportunity of deliberating about some policy or electoral choice, and then reinterviewed.

“Better” How?

One sense of “better” in this connection revolves around the correspondence between obtained and authentically majoritarian or “full-information” outcomes—what the majority would favor if everyone knew enough to know what choices would best comport with his or her own values or interests. Outcomes in turn rest, in some more or less qualifiedly majoritarian fashion, on the distribution of votes—or, between elections, on the distribution of policy preferences possibly anticipating votes. By definition, the best distribution of policy or electoral preferences is the full-information distribution. Better citizens, in this light, are those tending to produce distributions of policy and electoral preferences and thus policy and electoral outcomes closer to what would obtain under full information. The value of deliberation is that it may increase individual citizens’ understanding of their own interests, however defined, and of what conduces to them.

A second sense of “better” concerns citizens’ definitions of their interests. Deliberation may make citizens more public spirited. They may come, in the process of discussing the issues with others and, partly as a result, learning and thinking more about others and their interests, to take greater account of the interests of others—of either the population as a whole or at least wider sections of it. In the first sense, the best case is when everyone understands *his or her own interests* and what given policy or electoral choices imply for them and votes or opines

accordingly; in this second sense, it is when everyone understands *the public interest* and what given policy or electoral choices imply for it and votes or opines accordingly.

We draw this distinction starkly in the interest of analytical clarity. In practice, the aggregation of private interests may approximate the public interest, to the extent that exists. And, in practice, many people must jointly maximize their own and the public interest—with weights that are unclear and probably vary but may lean toward the former. At least arguably, in fact, that is what they should be doing—with weights leaning more toward the latter. Public-spiritedness need not require putting the public interest consistently ahead of one's own (or one's family's). It need only require that the public interest be admitted to the calculus, as something to consider in weighing the merits of given alternatives.¹

For now, leaving these and other complexities aside, we simply draw the distinction between the more efficient pursuit and the enlargement of one's interests, two different ways in which deliberation may arguably make for better citizens. Since the enlargement of interests presumably depends on discussion, not just isolated learning or rumination, we may speak in this connection of “full-deliberation,” rather than merely “full-information” preferences.

A third sense arises from the possibility of distortion in the visible distribution of preferences. At any given level of deliberation, the observed and actual distributions may differ, as consequently may the obtained and full-deliberation outcomes, if some people voice their policy preferences more effectively than others or if not everyone votes. Another plausible effect of deliberation, however, is to increase participation and the audible expression of preferences.

A fourth sense is more purely procedural. The touchstone for the first three senses is the “full-deliberation” distribution of preferences. The first two differ only in their expectations regarding the mix of public versus private interests the “full-deliberation” distribution reflects and in their valuations of public versus private interests. The fourth sense, by contrast, has nothing directly to do with the “full-deliberation” distribution of preferences. It concerns only the conditions facilitating democracy itself. Deliberation may make citizens more overtly supportive of the democratic system and less likely to behave in ways that may threaten it. Deliberating citizens should grow fonder of democracy, more tolerant of their opponents, etc.

For want of better labels, let us call these four plausible effects *efficiency*, *breadth*, *voice*, and *support*. The preceding paragraph pits the first three against the last, but there is also an important divide between the last three and the first. Directly, efficiency benefits only the individual. The underlying model resembles that of the market, the desirable attributes those of *homo economicus*. Individuals need and arguably should seek only their own interests. The public interest is served—if not indeed defined—by the aggregation of the preferences of individuals pursuing their private interests as efficiently as possible. By contrast, breadth, support, and even voice benefit the individual citizen less directly. Citizens are “better” in these senses because they are doing good for the polity and only incidentally themselves, rather than vice versa. This paper focuses on these effects. Again for want of a better label, let us group them as *democraticness*.

“Democraticness” and Deliberation

But these “democratic” effects are still very broadly drawn. What more narrowly drawn variables are involved? We believe and should like to argue here that the some of the likeliest candidates are:

1. “Political Sophistication” (organized political cognition). The most obvious and immediate effect, almost tautologous but still worth noting explicitly. The more knowledge or Informed—they should be aware of competing arguments and crucial factual knowledge about politics and policy.

2. Political Interest. Deliberation should stoke interest. The more you know, think, and talk about something the more interested in it you become (as well as vice versa).

3. Political Participation. The more interested you are, in turn, the more you are apt to take action, to sign petitions, to give time or money to candidates or causes, and the like.

4. “Internal Political Efficacy” (something akin to “empowerment”). The more you know, think, and talk about something, *ceteris paribus*), the more you tend to feel capable of dealing with it.

5. “External Political Efficacy” (a belief in government responsiveness). The more you know, think, and talk about some domain in which decisions are taken by a democratically chosen elite, the more you tend to appreciate the constraints, competing demands, and tradeoffs decision-makers face and the less to ascribe unwelcome decisions to mere indifference.

6. Political Trust. The reasoning is similar to that for external political efficacy, a similar variable. Grappling with the complexities most issues entail may increase ordinary citizens’ appreciation of what government decision makers must deal with.

7. Political “Respect” (a willingness to regard one’s opponents as misguided rather evil, petty, or corrupt). This effect too rests similar reasoning, the main difference being that it is people holding opposing views, the vast majority of whom are also ordinary citizens, who tend to benefit from increased understanding. There are in fact reasonable arguments to be made for most prominent positions, even if the arguments for some alternative outweigh them. Deliberators come to see that.

8. Political Empathy (an appreciation of the interests of others situated very differently from oneself). This probably stems more from discussion than from isolated learning or cogitation. Seeing and hearing people from very different walks of life conveys a sense of needs and aspirations, as well as the constraints they labor under—and of the legitimacy of the former and reality of the latter.

9. “Sociotropism” (Kiewiet and Kinder’s (xxxx) term but at least roughly the same as “public spiritedness” *à la* Mill). Deliberators may tend to take greater account of the interests of

more inclusive collectivities—of one’s town rather than just oneself or one’s family, of the nation rather than just one’s town, etc. Again discussion may be the key, as Mull suggests. It won’t do in public discussion to offer arguments that a given policy alternative will benefit oneself or one’s family. That, in itself, will arouse some mix of laughter and disdain, no support. The only chance of persuading anyone is to argue that the alternative will benefit the public as a whole, or at least a large majority. Even if this is initially mere tactics, there is much evidence in psychology to suggest that people induced to rehearse given arguments come to believe them. Similarly, if perhaps still more easily, deliberators train themselves in a *style* of argumentation—in terms of the public good—even if, substantively, they are merely selecting from among a larger set of arguments they already believe and are therefore not persuading themselves.

Deliberation, Participation, and ‘Better Citizens’

As this last point suggests, a great deal of this discussion resonates with and is partly inspired by a venerable literature concerning the salutary effects of political participation. The argument, stemming particularly from Tocqueville ([1835, 1840] 1961) and Mill ([1861] 1999), and more recently from Pateman (1970) and Mansbridge (1991), is that participation may have an “educative function.” Tocqueville’s observations about American juries, town meetings, and political associations had a great influence on Mill, who reviewed both volumes of his *Democracy in America* extensively. In *Considerations on Representative Government*, Mill called for the development of what he termed “schools of public spirit”—institutions like the jury or town meeting that might get citizens to participate conscientiously in the discussion of public issues. In the process, he argued, they would come to think beyond their most narrow and immediate self-interest.

Later theorists like Pateman have cited Mill as the exemplar of the argument that political participation improves the habits of mind and character of the citizenry (for an excellent overview, see Mansbridge 1999). Yet it is at least arguable that the “treatment” Mill had in mind was not political participation *per se* but participation in some form of deliberation or political discussion. The crux of his argument seems to concern *the effects of discussion in a context of responsibility*. In responding to skepticism about participation’s ability to educate all ranks of society (a key challenge for the educative argument), he says:

It is by political discussion that the manual labourer, whose employment is a routine, and whose way of life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances or ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events which take place far off, have a most sensible effect even on his personal interests; *and it is from political discussion and collective political action* that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow citizens. (Mill, emphases added)

But what sort of political discussion can be expected to have such effects? Mill’s discussion of “schools of public spirit” invokes the Athenian experience with the people’s court (the *dicastery*), which used random samples of several hundred citizens to deliberate, not just about legal cases but also about broader political and policy issues (Mill, p. 118.) He also cites

the Assembly in Athens and the jury in Britain and the US. In these institutions, the citizen “is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities” (Mill, p. 79).

Mill appears to envision two levels of deliberation—on the part of ordinary citizens and within elite bodies like Parliament, where, ideally, every argument offered is answered, and decisions are taken on the merits. His model for Parliament is an ideal deliberative body, a

Congress of Opinions...where every person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind as well or better than he could speak it himself—not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; where those whose opinion is over-ruled feel satisfied that it is heard, and set aside not by a mere act of will, but for what are thought superior reasons” (Mill, p. 116).

Mill seems to be thinking that the perfected version of this deliberative process will occur in Parliament but that ordinary citizens may emulate it in local institutions fostering discussion and responsibility, like juries and town meetings—“schools of public spirit.”

The discussion Mill has in mind, moreover, is not just any discussion. The process of weighing competing arguments and then deciding on the merits he idealizes in the Congress of Opinions, and envisions in “schools of public spirit” is the very much the same as what we have been terming balanced deliberation. Mill seems to think that such a process will produce better citizens. Is he right?

The View from Deliberative Polling

There has not been much relevant evidence. Even the very large literature on political sophistication, deliberation’s most natural and natural and immediate product, has not given these sorts of effects much systematic attention. A number of studies, notably including the one by Finkel (xxxx) cited by Mansbridge (1999), have estimated the politicizing and ennobling effects of political participation, but the deliberation in most participation actually entailing some deliberation—working in an election campaign, for example—is utterly imbalanced, a very far cry from what Mill had in mind. What little evidence we have, moreover, is mostly from surveys. There is still, as Pedersen (1982) noted two decades ago, not much from experiments.

This essay introduces evidence from Deliberative Polling. The basic design is by now well known. A random sample is interviewed, invited to a common site for a weekend of discussion, provided carefully balanced briefing materials laying out the major arguments for and against given policy proposals or electoral choices, and reinterviewed at the end of the weekend. The discussion alternate between small group sessions led by trained moderators and plenary sessions in which participants get to put questions composed by their small group to panels of policy experts, decision-makers, and sometimes politicians. The proceedings have always, so far, been televised, either live or taped and edited into a documentary.²

The experimental treatment in a Deliberative Poll is deliberation. The participants are given balanced information in the briefing materials, provided with incentives to learn, think, and talk about the issues on their own during the several weeks' interval between the initial interview and the on-site deliberations, and thrown into on-site exchanges with fellow participants and expert or decision-making panelists. Deliberative Polling thus always affords a before-and-after contrast for the participants. We shall refer to the times of the initial interview and the completion of the same questionnaire at the end of the deliberative weekend as T1 and T2.

But in a number of cases control groups afford additional contrasts. In the National Issues Convention the “nonparticipants”—those initial interviewees who for whatever reason did not attend the deliberative weekend—were reinterviewed by telephone at T2. An independent random sample was also interviewed, also by telephone, at the same time. And participants, nonparticipants, and another independent random sample were interviewed more briefly some ten months later, at what we shall call T3. Not every question was put to each sample at each point, but subject to that qualification, the participants can be compared not only to themselves at T1 but to the nonparticipants and the independent random sample at both T2 and T3. For further discussion, see Luskin and Fishkin (1998).

In the Deliberative Poll on the Australian Constitutional Referendum of 1999, the nonparticipants were re-interviewed and an independent sample was interviewed a few weeks after the Deliberative Poll, just after the referendum, at what we shall again call T3, although this T3 is far earlier than the National Issues Convention's and thus measures something rather different. This T3 is still mainly capturing the deliberative effect, whereas the NIC's is also, and more or less equally, capturing the inevitable decay that occurs when participants return to their everyday lives, with the same old incentives to believe or favor this and disbelieve or oppose that and the same old one-sided information flows.

In the Deliberative Poll on the British general election of 1997, there was a miniature, three- or four-item re-interview with the participants just after the election, a week after the deliberative weekend, to verify whether the participants actually voted, and for which party. Here T3 is just a week after T2. There was no control group, just this brief further interview with the participants.

Several further points should be noted. First, the control groups are really “quasi control groups” (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, Luskin and Fishkin 1998), separated from the treatment group entirely by self-selection in the case of the nonparticipants and partly by self-selection in the case of the independent random samples. The contrasts with them are revealing, even so. Second, the differences on the various four- or five-point scales are bigger than may appear. Bear in mind that these are net effects and that night-and-day changes are not to be expected (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, Luskin 2000). The increase of .18 on the 1-to-4 scale of the respondent's frequency of talking about politics, for example, is quite sizable. Third, the reported *p*-values are currently twice what they should be, because based on two- rather than the more appropriate one-tailed tests.

Results

Measuring quality, when it comes to political cognition, is difficult, but quality (the density of thought) is highly correlated with quantity (the level of political information), which is far easier to measure. In a series of previous papers, we have shown that the deliberative treatment in Deliberative Polling produces large, sometimes staggering increases in political information (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002, Luskin and Fishkin 1998, Fishkin and Luskin 1998), Luskin, Fishkin, Jowell, and Park xxxx, Luskin, Fishkin, and Plane xxxx, Luskin, Fishkin, Higley, Ryan, and MacAllister 1999). This proposition is now firmly established. Here, therefore, we focus on other aspects of democraticness.

Political Interest

The results in Table 1 suggest that deliberation does indeed increase interest. A question (Table 1 about here) asking the respondent the extent to which he or she is generally interested in politics appears in three Deliberative Polls.

Political Participation

The first five items in Table 2 are from the NIC, where the were asked only of participants and only at T1 and T3 (ten months after the on-site deliberations). Items 2 through 4, about having worked on an election campaign, having contacted a government official, and (Table 2 about here) having given money to a party, are asked in a have-you-ever form at T1 and in a have-you-since-January (since the deliberative weekend) at T3. The table, however, transforms the T3 results to have-you-ever too, for comparability's sake. The difference between the T1 and T3 entries, accordingly, is the percentage of DP participants who engaged in the given activity for the first time during the months following the DP. These results are not only highly significant statistically but impressive: Four percent were moved to work in a election campaign for the first time, six percent to contact a government official for the first time, and eight percent to give money to a party for the first time. The NIC results also show a sizable increase in the frequency with which participants report talking about politics.

Regarding voting participation, the DP on the British general election of 1997 show that the 82 percent who reported intending to vote when first interviewed increased to 87 percent at the end of the deliberative weekend and that 96 percent reported actually having voted just after the election, a week later. Granted, all these figures are probably inflated, and the increase could be merely a function of increased reluctance to admit to not intending to vote or not having voted, but the pattern is consistent with everything else we see, in both this and other tables.

Internal Political Efficacy

Almost across the board, deliberation seems to increase internal political efficacy, partly, no doubt, as a function of veridical self-perception. Deliberators do emerge better informed, more capable of contributing their bit to collective activities that have some chance of affecting the complexion of policy outputs. Correspondingly, they tend to agree more with statements like “I have political opinions worth listening to,” and to disagree more with statements like “politics is too complicated for people like me to understand” and “people like me have no say in government.” The three summary indices—entries 3, 8, and 14—in Table 3 all show significant increases.³ For entry 8, based on NIC data, the T2 participant mean is also significantly greater (Table 3 about here)

than the T2 separate random sample mean, although the tenth-month-later mean suggests the effect is temporary. Entries 13 and 14, the lone internal efficacy items in the British General Election and Australian Constitutional Referendum Deliberative Polls, respectively, show similar results: a significant pre- versus post-deliberation increase in the first case and a significant T3 difference between the participants and both control groups in the second.

External Political Efficacy

The participants begin looking like the independent random sample with respect to external political efficacy. (See Table 4.) They do not gain much from T2 to T3, either in the NIC, where the interval is of ten months, nor in the Australian Constitutional Referendum DP, where the interval is of just a few weeks. They do, however, gain a great deal of external (Table 4 about here)

political efficacy between T2 and T3. They agree more that “public officials care what people like me think” (in the NIC) and that politicians are aware of what people think (in the Australian Constitutional Referendum DP) and disagree more that it “is too difficult for people to make their voices heard” (in the DP on the future of the British Monarchy).

Political Empathy

We have only two relevant items, both from the British Health Service Deliberative Poll, one asking how strongly the respondent agrees or disagrees with statements that Poverty is the (Table 5 about here)

fault of the poor” and that “the government are too concerned with the unsuccessful.” Neither shows any effect.

Sociotropism

Here we have just one item, again from the British Health Service Deliberative Poll, but in this case the results show a significant effect. The question asks how strongly the respondent agrees or disagrees with the statement that “when voting, people should always put the interests of the public as a whole before those of themselves and their family.” The mean level of agreement increases significantly from T1 to T2.

Political Trust.

We have only asked once about political trust, in the Australian Constitutional Referendum Deliberative Poll. The results, in the second row of Table 6, show a very large T3 difference between the participants on the one hand and the nonparticipants and the independent random sample on the other hand.

Other Attitudes toward the System

Under this heading we have questions about the respondent’s assessment of how well democracy works (in the British General Election, British Monarchy, and Australian Constitutional Referendum Deliberative Polls) and feelings about parties and politicians (in Australian Constitutional Referendum Deliberative Poll only). The results are mixed but do offer some support for the idea that deliberation makes citizens more supportive of the democratic system. In two of the three datasets, the participants’ assessments of democracy’s performance became significantly more positive. The results from the additional T3 measurements in the Australian Constitutional Referendum Deliberative Poll show some subsequent recession, even as the contrasts with both control groups confirm the effect. Two of the three measures of feelings toward parties and politicians, averaging the feelings registered toward individual parties and politicians, show no significant difference between the participants and either control group, but the remaining one, a single, synoptic question about the respondent’s feeling toward politicians, shows a very large and significant pre- versus post-deliberation increase.

Conclusion

Much of what is claimed—of what we among other have claimed—to be good about deliberation revolves around the effects on electoral and policy outcomes, particularly on the correspondence between observed and full-information (or full-deliberation) distributions of policy or electoral preferences. This is the sort of effect we have called efficiency. But efficiency in this sense does not exhaust deliberation’s important effects. Not on variables consequential for the individual citizen. Not, still more importantly from our perspective, on variables consequential for democracy. What matters for democracy is not just the authenticity of citizens’ preferences, but their attitudinal and behavioral engagement, their attitudes and

behaviors toward the democratic system and their antagonists within it, and their appreciation of interests other than or beyond their own. The results from Deliberative Polling, reviewed in these pages, suggest that the more citizens deliberate, the more informed, interested, participatory, efficacious, trusting, supportive of democracy, and sociotropic they become.

These results suggest that democratic institutions affording increased opportunities for deliberation may serve as Millian schools for democratic citizenship. Enterprises like the Kettering Foundation's National Issues Forums, through which thousands of groups meet around the U.S. yearly, discussing key policy issues with the help of carefully balanced briefing documents and trained moderators (Mathews 1994) come to mind. These designs generally rest on self-selected, hence non-representative samples and lack the instrumentation necessary to address most questions about deliberation's effects. But while thus not very useful for the main purposes of Deliberative polling—providing a glimpse of more informed and thoughtful public opinion and estimating deliberation's effects—they may nevertheless, applied widely enough, be very useful for building better citizens.⁴

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Table 1^Δ
Political Interest

Variable	DP	Time	Range	Mean	Std. Err.	N
Interest in Politics Generally	British General Election	T1	1 – 5	3.49	.06	272
		T2		3.49	.06	269
	National issues Convention	T1	1 – 4	3.13	.04	385
		T3		3.34***	.04	385
	Australian Referendum	T1	1 – 4	3.23	.04	356
		T2		3.42***	.03	346
		T3		3.31 [†]	.04	316
		T3 non		3.22	.05	228
		T3 RS		3.12###	.01	3424

*Significantly different from T1, $p < .10$

**Significantly different from T1, $p < .05$

***Significantly different from T1, $p < .01$

[†]Significantly different from T2, $p < .10$

^{††}Significantly different from T2, $p < .05$

^{†††}Significantly different from T2, $p < .01$

#Significantly different from T3, $p < .10$

##Significantly different from T3, $p < .05$

###Significantly different from T3, $p < .01$

^ΔAll p values are based on two-tailed tests. For the Australian Constitutional Referendum DP, T3 denotes the period, just after the referendum during which the Australian Election Studies administered a mailed questionnaire to participants, nonparticipants, and an independent random sample. For the National Issues Convention, T3 denotes instead a period approximately 10 months later, just after the November election, during which the National Opinion Research Center reinterviewed the participants by telephone. In both cases, T1 denotes the time of the initial interview, and T2 the time of the end of the on-site deliberations, but note that the gap between T2 and T3 is very short in the Australian Constitutional Referendum DP but quite long in the National Issues Convention. “Non” denotes “nonparticipants” (those initial interviewees who did not attend the on-site deliberations), RS an independent random sample.

Table 2^Δ
Political Participation

Variable	DP	Time	Range	Mean	Std. Err.	N
1. How Often R Talks about Politics	National issues Convention	T1	1 – 4	2.86	.05	385
		T3		3.04***	.04	385
2. R Worked on Election Campaign?	National issues Convention	T1	0, 1	.27	.01	387
		T3		.31***	.01	386
3. R Ever Seen or Contacted a Govt. Official?	National issues Convention	T1	0, 1	.59	.03	386
		T3		.65***	.02	386
4. Contributed Money to Party	National issues Convention	T1	0, 1	.33	.02	384
		T3		.41***	.02	383
5. Non-Voting Participation (Average of Items 2-4)	National issues Convention	T1	0 – 1	.35	.02	384
		T3		.44***	.01	383
6. Will R definitely vote?	British General Election	T1	0 – 1	.82	.01	269
		T2		.87***	.01	270
Did R Vote?		T3		.96***	.01	272

*

^ΔSee notes to Table 1.

Table 3^Δ
Internal Political Efficacy

Variable	DP	Time	Range	Mean	Std. Err.	N
1. People like Me No say in Government	Australian Referendum	T1	1 – 5	3.53	.08	353
		T2		2.89***	.08	342
2. I Have Political Opinions Worth Listening to	Australian Referendum	T1	1 – 5	4.03	.07	350
		T2		4.07	.06	335
3. Internal Efficacy Index (Average of Items 1-2)	Australian Referendum	T1	1 – 5	3.24	.06	347
		T2		3.61***	.05	333
4. People like Me No Say in Government	National issues Convention	T1	0 – 1	.45	.02	386
		T2		.35***	.02	378
		T3		.41	.02	384
		T2 RS		.51†††	.02	426
5. Politics Too Complicated	National issues Convention	T1	0 – 1	.51	.02	378
		T2		.52	.02	382
		T3		.49	.02	386
		T2 RS		.54###	.02	429
6. I Have Political Opinions Worth Listening to	National issues Convention	T1	0 – 1	.77	.01	372
		T2		.87***	.01	376
		T3		.83	.01	382
		T2 RS		.80	.01	425
7. Stand up for Opinions Even if Others Disagree	National issues Convention	T1	0 – 1	.91	.02	382
		T2		.95***	.01	374
		T2 RS		.93†	.01	429
8. Internal Efficacy Index (Average of Items 4-7)	National issues Convention	T1	0 – 1	.65	.01	351
		T2		.72***	.01	348
		T3		.65†††	.01	378
		T2 RS		.66	.01	409
9. People like Me No Say in Government	British Monarchy	T1	1 – 5	3.73	.07	255
		T2		3.64	.08	240
10. I Am Better Informed than Most about Politics	British Monarchy	T1	1 – 5	2.89	.06	254
		T2		3.03**	.06	234

11. I Have Political Opinions Worth Listening to	British Monarchy	T1	1 – 5	3.60	.05	253
		T2		3.75**	.05	235
12. Internal Efficacy Index (Average of Items 9-11)	British Monarchy	T1	1 – 5	2.93	.04	253
		T2		3.06***	.04	233
13. I Have Political Opinions Worth Listening to	British General Election	T1	1 – 5	3.38	.07	248
		T2		3.58***	.06	240
14. No Matter Who Vote for, Can Make Difference	Australian Referendum	T3	1 – 5	3.86	.06	314
		T3 non		3.61##	.08	228
		T3 RS		3.70##	.02	3371

^ΔSee notes to Table 1.

Table 4^Δ
External Political Efficacy

Variable	DP	Time	Range	Mean	Std. Err.	N
1. Public Officials Care What People like Me Think	National issues Convention	T1	1 – 4	2.30	.04	377
		T2		2.62***	.04	377
		T3		2.58***	.05	385
		T2 RS		2.22###	.05	427
2. National Political Leaders Out of Touch	National issues Convention	T1	1 – 4	3.00	.04	376
		T2		2.84***	.04	381
		T3		2.81***	.05	379
		T2 RS		3.05###	.04	418
3. External Efficacy Index (Average of Items 1-2)	National issues Convention	T1	1 – 4	2.15	.03	370
		T2		2.39***	.03	376
		T3		2.388**	.04	378
		T2 RS		2.08###	.04	416
4. Too Difficult for people to Make Voices Heard	British Monarchy	T1	1 – 5	3.91	.06	256
		T2		3.89	.07	243
5. Politicians Know What People Think	Australian Referendum	T3	1 – 4	2.47	.06	315
		T3 non		2.33###	.07	228
		T3 RS		2.28***	.02	3370

^ΔSee notes to Table 1.

Table 5^Δ
Empathy and Sociotropism

Variable	DP	Time	Range	Mean	Std. Err.	N
1. National vs. Self-interest	British Health Service	T1	1 - 5	3.18	0.1	223
		T2		3.30*	0.1	220
2. Poverty Fault of the Poor	British Health Service	T1	1 - 5	1.95	0.1	222
		T2		1.95	0.1	221
3. Government too Concerned with the Unsuccessful	British Health Service	T1	1 - 5	2.49	0.1	216
		T2		2.50	0.1	211

^ΔSee notes to Table 1.

Table 6^Δ
Attitudes toward the System

Variable	DP	Time	Range	Mean	Std. Err.	N
1. How Well Democracy Works? ^a	British General Election	T1	1 – 4	2.75	.04	264
		T2		2.79	.04	261
	British Monarchy	T1	1 – 4	2.74	.04	247
		T2		2.88***	.04	230
	Australian Referendum	T1	1 – 4	2.90	.05	352
		T2		3.41***	.04	344
		T3		3.18†††	.04	313
		T3 non		3.04##	.04	227
		T3 RS		2.90###	.01	3342
2. Trust Government	Australian Referendum	T3	1– 4	2.64	.06	314
		T3 non		2.15###	.07	227
		T3 RS		2.02###	.02	3405
3. Mean Like-Dislike across Parties	Australian Referendum	T3	0 – 10	4.50	.07	314
		T3 non		4.50	.09	228
		T3 RS		4.53	.03	3371
4. Feeling Toward Politicians	Australian Referendum	T1	1 – 5	2.73	.06	356
		T2		3.13***	.05	334
5. Average Like-Dislike across Politicians	Australian Referendum	T3	0 – 10	4.27	.07	314
		T3 non		4.22	.07	228
		T3 RS		4.21	.02	3385

^ΔSee notes to Table 1.

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¹For some additional thoughts on deliberation's possible effects on these first two senses of better citizenship, see Luskin (2000).

² For further discussion, see Fishkin (1995), Fishkin (1997), or Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell (2002).

³The items are reflected as necessary prior to averaging, so that higher numbers always represent more efficacious responses.

⁴For a still more ambitious proposal in this vein, see Ackerman and Fishkin, in press.